Learning Locally: Reshaping Third-Party Monitoring in Syria

In a complex crisis like Syria, third-party monitoring plays a vital role in offering insights, alternative perspectives, and additional layers of accountability for delivering humanitarian and development assistance to affected communities – particularly for donors with limited access to these communities.

Proximity Data Collection in Deir ez-Zour, Syria, 2024

Since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, the situation in Syria has changed dramatically. As aid actors operating in Syria, we are in the middle of a crucial moment where we need to reevaluate our roles and reflect on how we can best support Syrian community in their journey ahead. For those engaged with third-party monitoring – and the projects it supports – we need to ask how third-party monitoring can evolve to be more localized and thereby help humanitarian and development actors to navigate this new path forward?

Focusing on Learning

Working with field monitors who are deeply connected to – and themselves from the communities being supported – is an important baseline for localized third-party monitoring, but other steps are needed to shift third-party monitoring from a donor-mandated exercise of upward accountability to an opportunity for adjustment, improvement, and learning. A well-designed, locally led third-party monitoring platform can be more than a tick-box exercise; it can provide crucial insights about (a) communities’ satisfaction with the support they receive, (b) their priorities for future interventions, and (c) what could be done better.

In many cases, third-party monitoring is approached as a relatively straightforward exercise that includes reviewing project documentation, visiting project sites, and conducting interviews or discussions with affected communities. While Syrian organizations typically have the chance to discuss the findings, monitoring visits can still feel like daunting exercises – with an external entity critically reviewing the projects and organizational efforts. With conflicting priorities and over-burdened implementation teams, the focus tends to be on responding to key findings and achieving reasonable outcomes, leaving little time for reflection.

To truly benefit from the vast amount of data collected through third-party monitoring, the tasks of TPM agents need to be expanded to not only include reports, but also learning workshops, feedback sessions, and co-analysis with the monitored organizations during which they share knowledge and insights. To achieve this approach, third-party monitors must function as facilitators of learning, not merely as observers or watchdogs.

Taking Stock of Progress

We can already see some progress in this regard in Syria, where some monitoring agents are including learning components in their work. These organizations are trying to involve the monitored organizations in the montioring process from beginning to end, thereby endeavoring to not only share the outcome with the monitored organization, but also to exhaust the process as a learning exercise.

Third-party monitoring agents can support local organizations to (a) better understand the process, the employed tools, and the analysis, as well as (b) translate the findings into actionable steps. To enable active participation and build a base for learning, the involved processes, reports, and discussions must be conducted in Arabic. This ensures that local organizations can involve not only their office-based staff, but also those working directly within the communities.

Report templates should also be practical and actionable, ideally designed in a format that can be easily shared with communities without requiring significant time or resources to adapt. Most importantly, we must acknowledge that findings and solutions are only valuable if they are discussed collaboratively, bringing together the third-party monitoring agent, local organizations, the project’s donor, and the communities themselves.

While crucial data is already delivered to project implementors, it should also be shared with communities. We should actively seek ways of encouraging community participation in the interpretation of findings. This process may take more of time, but it will ultimately enable project be more effective if they can draw upon local solutions through an ongoing conversation. Local organizations can lead those engagements, while simultaneously sharing knowledge with field monitors on how to best engage communities.

Incorporating New Methods

As Syrian communities enter a new phase, there is an opportunity to go beyond common methods like key informant interviews and focus group discussions – by introducing different approaches that facilitate community-driven learning. For instance, interactive community workshops can be organized to present findings of the monitoring and thus encourage discussions and feedback to shape recommendations and follow-up actions. Those workshops could build upon infographics, posters, or storytelling to present data in a way that resonates with community members. Ideally, local organizations or community leaders could take the lead in facilitating these workshops—presenting findings, moderating discussions, and co-creating solutions with participating community members. To stay accountable, a follow-up system needs to be in place to track if and how the community insights were reflected into the actual project implementation or new projects.

In essence, third-party monitoring agents need to find a way to carefully balance between the required neutrality on the one hand and meaningful local engagement on the other. The approach we need right now is one that goes beyond traditional monitoring frameworks and strengthens local organizations and systems. It is one that undoubtedly prioritizes localization principles.

Looking Forward

Syria is now transitioning beyond a humanitarian response to focus on early recovery, development, peace, and community resilience – and entering a new phase of accountability. The end of Assad’s regime opens the opportunity for local organizations to speak freely – and full of hope – about their future, rebuilding of communities and rehabilitation of trust. While the devastating humanitarian emergencies of the past years have demonstrated that local organizations are ready and to respond to the crises they face, now it is the time for Syrian organizations to truly lead the country’s rebuilding.

The coming weeks and months will be a time of adjustment as the humanitarian system is reshaped and mechanisms are established to address social cohesion, peacebuilding, and development—through a whole-of-Syria approach that places local voices and ownership at its core. While Northwest Syria has often been highlighted as a best-practice example for localization, true local leadership and decision-making has been lacking. We are now entering a phase where localization is non-negotiable and must be fully embraced by all donors, international organizations, and supporters.

Katharina is a consultant specializing in localization and locally led humanitarian responses, with a focus on the Middle East. She has worked extensively with local actors and holds a master’s degree in international Humanitarian Action.

Toward Stability: The Importance of Water in Syria’s Transition

This blog is the first in a series of thought pieces discussing the current liminal moment in Syria, with the goal of exploring core issues that will significant impact stabilization prospects in the country.

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A staggering insurgency and ensuing dissolution of a 54-year authoritarian regime has reopened a chapter of old challenges in Syria, but with new, hopeful possibilities. Despite fundamental differences in the contexts of countries grappling with the consequences of the Arab uprisings over the last decade, one common theme has been the vulnerability to water scarcity. There are consequently calls to avoid repeating previous mistakes made in the aftermath of changes in power elsewhere in the region.

Lessons have (theoretically) been learned about climate-driven displacement and demographic changes – as well as disruptions to local value-chains and agricultural practices. So far, the dangers of unchecked control over water resources have not been adequately recognized at points of peace.

For Syrians to have a real chance to rebuild their country, local and regional stakeholders need to recognize that long-term political stability will depend upon a water agreement that enables improved living conditions for citizens across the country.

Syria is acutely vulnerable – and poorly prepared – to deal with climate change, even more so than neighboring Iraq. The economy and food self-sufficiency of Syria has historically depended on agriculture, particularly from the Northeast Syria breadbasket. However, groundwater in the region now contains toxic fluoride levels from over-exploitation, while irrigation from waterways relies on inflated fuel prices or damaged hydroelectric infrastructure for its pumping.

The needs and gaps have become starker amidst the recent influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into the Northeast, illustrating the strain that has been placed on humanitarian services due to the lack of water. Ninety-two percent of IDPs from Aleppo have reported a lack of WASH services, with the region continuing to record increasing cholera cases.

Although the increasing desertification of Syria is driven by climate change, the country is also bearing the consequences of repeated water weaponization during its 14-year conflict, which has persisted throughout the recent offensive. Areas surrounding the strategic Tishreen and Euphrates dams in Manbij and Tabqa have seen continued armed clashes and changes in control since the opposition forces took control of Damascus this month. On December 10, the structure of Tishreen Dam was affected, with technicians unable to access the facility for repairs.

The NES NGO Forum called for the cessation of hostilities in the vicinity of Tishreen dam, warning that severe damage could affect up to one million people in the region. The following day, the Global Coalition reached an agreement with Türkiye on the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from territory west of the Euphrates, allowing the Turkish-Backed Syrian National Army (TSNA) to take control of Manbij and Tabqa.

Tishreen is vital not only for being the furthest upstream Syrian dam on the Euphrates, but is also the first dam below the confluence of the rainfed Sajur River, which runs along the northern Manbij boundary. A non-functioning dam poses immediate risks of severe flooding and could adversely affect hydroelectric stations downstream, including in Tabqa. A vast proportion of electricity in Syria, including in Homs, is produced by hydroelectric stations on the Euphrates.

Should the Northeast become unable to generate hydroelectricity, households would grow increasingly dependent on fuel imports – at a time when the country has lost access to Iranian oil and faces a volatile exchange rate.

Water is a key tool in the geopolitical arsenal being deploying to counter the security risks posed by the SDF and the consolidation of Kurdish territory on Türkiye’s borders. Airstrikes have repeatedly targeted infrastructure in the Northeast, with frequent diversions of the supply of water to Alouk station . With 89 percent of annual water volume in the Euphrates coming from the Turkish basin, its continued flow will be the primary determinant of the ability of Syrian actors to deliver life-saving health and food-security services.

An urgent window of opportunity exists during which recent efforts to prevent water politics and weaponization within the Syrian political transition could be achieved. The establishment of Syrian control over water resources must be given precedence in geopolitical recalculations, particularly those of Türkiye and the Global Coalition. As the bargaining chips of security guarantees, oil control, and reconstruction funds begin to be exchanged, an agreement on future water supply must be understood as a key variable for long-term stability and rehabilitation in Syria.

If one lesson can be taken from the Syrian revolution, it is that the capacity and success of armed groups in Syria should not be seen as vacuum-held “spoilers,” but rather as intrinsically linked to community interests. Many of the Arab populations in the Northeast have used the developments of the last weeks to amplify their opposition to SDF-rule. Manbij saw non-TSNA elements push back against the SDF, while local demonstrations called for the expulsion of the SDF in Tabqa. Notably, employees from local water stations in the Deiri villages of Marat and Mazlum also demonstrated against the SDF when its forces attempted to dismantle and relocate equipment from internationally supported stations. Yet, these actions should not be understood as automatic endorsements of the TSNA, as Türkiye is widely viewed as being responsible for the destruction and lack of water across communities in the Northeast. There is also widespread preference the areas to be administered by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and more moderate factions.

Whichever transitional or long-term authority comes to govern the Northeast – or Syria as a whole – it will need to be able to consolidate its institutions and negotiate enforceable protection for water resources and infrastructure across the Euphrates basin. Poor living conditions, a devastated economy, and the spread of diseases are risks that could undermine effective and cohesive governance of a country that has been fractured for over a decade.

The overthrow of the Assad regime has provided a rare opportunity for water governance along the Euphrates basin to be addressed by advocating for Syrian sovereignty over its resources. Without reaching an enforceable and incentivized agreement between local and regional stakeholders on the protection and sharing of water resources, the Syria that its people have fought for may not reach fruition.  

Ellen Clarke is a research consultant specializing in conflict, climate, and humanitarian coordination. She is currently supporting Proximity's research in Syria and has worked on a range of issues in the country and the broader MENA region, including nature conservation.

Challenges, Setbacks and Opportunities: The Role of Women in Governance Amidst the Conflict in Yemen

As the world celebrates International Women’s Day, one of Proximity’s researchers, Dr. Alexandrine Dupras, takes a moment to reflect on the challenges facing Yemeni women amidst the country’s ongoing conflict.

Pre-Conflict Progress: Women's Inclusion in Governance

Before the onset of the conflict in 2015, Yemen had made significant progress advancing women's participation in the public sector. Drawing on a historical tradition of women's involvement in governance,[1] the country witnessed noteworthy developments in the decades preceding the 2015 conflict. Indeed, Yemen was the first country in the Arabian Peninsula to grant women the right to vote (in 1967).[2] Likewise, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, a series of policies and institutional frameworks were put in place to bolster women's engagement in the public sphere, leading to the recruitment and elevation of 1000s of women to prominent positions across public institutions. By 2015, a number of women had assumed high-profile roles. Amat Al Alim Alsoswa, for instance, was the ambassador to Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, and Wahiba Faraʽa was the Minister of State for Human Rights.[3] Furthermore, a solid legislative foundation for supporting women in governance was put in place, providing women with rights to engage in the country’s political life and creating institutions at national and subnational levels to promote the rights of women and ensure their concerns were reflected in public policies, programs, and plans.

In the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” and the widespread civil unrest, Yemen became entangled in power struggles and regional conflicts, precipitating a period of internal turmoil.[4] However, even amidst this chaos, Yemen was a trailblazer in the region, embarking on a path toward a so-called inclusive transition. This strategy materialized through the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), a 10-month negotiation process to build dialogue wherein 26.9% of its delegates were women. [5]

Gender Dynamics in Conflict: Impacts on Women's Participation

The protracted conflict has transformed Yemen's gender dynamics, eroding the previous achievements. The ascendance of conservative factions has hindered women's participation in meaningful political roles, with Yemen ranking 154 out of 156 countries in the 2021 Global Gender Gap report.[6] 

The conflict has undermined the effectiveness of salient institutions that were previously working to enhance the participation of women in the public sector. In 2001, for instance, the Ministry of Local Administration (MOLA) established Department of Women’s Development (DWD). The primary mandate of the DWD was to promote women’s involvement in public life. Subsequently efforts were made in 2009 to decentralize the DWD by establishing branches in districts, aiming to ensure broader representation and inclusion of women across Yemeni communities. The war undermined these endeavors. Amidst the fragmentation of government entities between Sana’a and Aden (alongside drastic budget constraints for ministries and public institutions), the DWD has remained largely inactive for several years. Although efforts were made to reinstate the DWD through a Resolution passed by the MOLA in areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government in 2022, it remains weak due to resource scarcity and constant instability.

Moreover, women's participation in governance in Yemen is also constrained by entrenched socio-cultural norms, the implications of which have become more acute amidst conflict. These norms delineate a division of labor between genders, relegating women to domestic and reproductive responsibilities, limiting their opportunities for engagement in public spheres such as governance.[7] Cultural and social norms bestow leadership roles on men in Yemen, with UN Women calculating that Yemeni women only hold 4.1% of leadership positions in the country in 2021.[8] Meanwhile, the mahram (male guardian) policy continues to restrict women's freedom of movement, hindering their general access to employment. Although it does not prohibit women from working, the requirement for women to be accompanied by a male relative during travel, particularly in areas controlled by the Houthis, severely restricts their mobility.

Some Opportunities to Move Forward

Despite the challenges facing women's participation in governance in Yemen, there have been notable efforts since 2015 to elevate their role in the peace process. Several initiatives have sought to address the current situation and empower women to assume greater roles in the public sphere.

The Peace Track Initiative (PTI) is as a women-led Yemeni organization established in 2015 with the mission of supporting the peace process and advocating for the inclusion of women and marginalized groups. PTI plays a pivotal role in feminist peacebuilding in Yemen, advocating for women's rights and emphasizing the significance of their participation in peace negotiations.

Another initiative, the Yemeni Women Pact for Peace and Security (known as Pact or “Tawafuq”), emerged from a conference organized by UN Women in Cyprus in 2015. This Track II initiative is dedicated to advancing peace and stability in conflict-affected regions by prioritizing women's perspectives in peace and security decisions. The Pact recognizes women's indispensable role in peacebuilding and strives to empower them to engage actively in decision-making processes, while also advocating for gender equality and women's rights as integral components of sustainable peace.

Furthermore, initiated in 2018 under the auspices of UN Women, the Feminist Summit serves as a consultative platform managed by women leaders. The summit is working to articulate a unified vision among women to influence the peace process in Yemen, fostering trust among women leaders and creating an inclusive space to support peacebuilding efforts. It also focuses on collaborative partnerships among women's organizations, advocating for women's rights, and facilitating the exchange of experiences and information to strengthen feminist advocacy efforts.

Entangled in regional conflict and the interests of foreign power, Yemen’s future is being shaped. Amidst this dire context, the long-term role of women in the country’s governance cannot be forgotten. International stakeholders need to work with Yemeni policymakers to acknowledge the invaluable role of Yemeni women in decision making. Yemeni women possess the insight and resilience necessary to help rebuild the nation – and their indispensable role in shaping Yemen's future cannot be overstated.

Alexandrine is a consultant specializing in international development sector and NGOs in the Middle East region. She holds a PhD in Sociology and has worked with several INGOs and third-sector organizations.

[1] Yemen has a long history of women being engaged in governance, stretching back to at least the 10th century BC with Queen Bilquis of Sheba and then Queen Arwa’s rule of the Sulayhid dynasty in the following century. See Fatima Mernissi, “The Forgotten Queens of Islam”, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

[2] Marta Colburn et al., “GAP III Yemen Country Profile Evaluation Report,” Third-Party Monitoring & Evaluation of Resilience Projects in Yemen in the Areas of Migration, TVET and Financial Inclusion, Report to the Delegation of the European Union to Yemen (Particip, 2021), 20.

[3] Colburn et al, “GAP III Yemen Country Profile Evaluation Report,” 2021, 20.

[4] Erica Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue”, United States Institute of Peace, 2014.

[5] Moosa Elayah et al., “National Dialogues as an Interruption of Civil War – the Case of Yemen,” Peacebuilding Vol. 8, No. 1 (2020): 98–117; and Jamal Benomar, “Is Yemen a New Model?” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 67, No. 1 (2013): 197–203.

[6]. World Economic Forum, “Global Gender Gap Report 2021,” Insight report (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2021), 19, https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2023/.

[7] Maha Awadh and Nuria Shuja’adeen, “Women in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Yemen”, Nahj Consulting, 2019, 15.

[8] UN Women, “Yemen Data”, Women Count (2023), retrieved from: https://data.unwomen.org/country/yemen; see also Ali Ahmad, Zena. “Yemeni Women: Leading into the Future | United Nations Development Programme”, UNDP, 2023, https://www.undp.org/yemen/blog/yemeni-women-leading-future.