The President of Syria’s interim government, Ahmed al-Shara’a, recently announced the members who will make up the preparatory committee charged with coordinating the much-anticipated National Dialogue Conference. The committee will reportedly work to develop recommendations for the interim government about the form and composition of the conference – a date for which has not yet been set.
Preparatory Committee Selection
The preparatory committee is made up of seven members (five men and two women): Hassan al-Daghim, Maher Alloush, Mohammad Mosatet, Yousef al-Hajer, Mustafa Musa, Huda al-Atassi, and Hind Qabwat. The initial reactions of the public to the selected members has been mixed. On the one hand, some local observers have argued that the selected members are legitimate representatives of civil society, praising the inclusion of al-Atassi and Qabwat in particular – both of whom have a proven track-record of engaging with civil society and humanitarian work. On the other hand, concerns were also raised that some of the members were picked because on their close ties to – or alignment with – al-Shara’a. For example, al-Hajer previously served as the head of the political bureau of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Musa served the head of the Salvation Government’s Shura Council, and Alloush served in the recently disbanded Ahrar al-Sham: a Syrian National Army (SNA) faction that is known to enjoy positive ties with HTS. Public opinion has also divided about the process through which the members were appointed. While some observers criticized the seemingly unilateral manner through which al-Shara’a appointed the members, others suggested that this process was reasonable given the need to expedite the process and make progress.
Progress of Committee
While it is too early to judge the effectiveness of the committee, the approach taken thus far has yielded some positive signs. Specifically, the committee has quickly launched its engagement with Syrians across governorates, travelling to Homs on February 16 – only a couple of days after its establishment. The dialogue there was reportedly attended by 400 people. While the mechanism used to select the attendees remains unclear to Proximity, the attendees reportedly encompassed a diverse ethnic, political, and religious groups. The discussions covering a wide range of topics, including transitional justice, the constitution, institutional reform, political liberties, and the economy. The impressions of attendees were positive, noting that the committee acted as listeners and facilitators – allowing the attendees to voice their opinion. On Monday, two more sessions were held (in Tartous, and Lattakia), with the nature of the discussion appearing to be largely similar to that of Homs.
Notable in the discussions so far is the sequence in which they have been held, with Homs, Lattakia, and Tartous each having experienced instability and concern since the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, given the concentration of persons and villages aligned with the al-Assad regime, the three governorates have also been the target of security campaigns aimed at eradicating remnants of al-Assad’s forces. There were also concerning incidents involving personal vendettas against remnants of the regime, which in some cases culminated in public executions. As such, the committee's sequencing is likely an attempt to (a) express its seriousness in prioritizing these tensions and (b) signal the government's investment in the inclusion of actors involved in these tensions – rather than excluding them as a punitive measure for their perceived alignment with the regime.
Following the dialogues, the committee will be tasked with nominating participants in the National Dialogue Conference. While the exact for this process remains unclear, the committee will reportedly nominate participants based on “expertise, public influence, and inclusivity.” The committee’s spokesperson, Hassan al-Daghim, noted that “no one will be invited based on religion, institutional ties, or party affiliations.” Implicit in these statements is the insistence on the official dissolution of any political or armed entities prior to their inclusion of the conference. This step has already been taken by the SNA and, more recently, the Syrian National Coalition, Negotiation Commission, and Syrian Interim Government. While this approach could open up a space for wider community participation while minimizing opportunities for political or armed groups attempting to co-opt the voices of ethno-religious groups in Syria, it also risks creating a situation where the committee (and al-Shara’a) is the one deciding what an inclusive and representative conference looks like – likely in a manner that fits its political interests.
Exclusion of SDF/DAANES
Concerns about inclusion are perhaps best reflected in the case of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) – both of which appear to have been deliberately left out of the process thus far. Al-Daghim even remarked that the SDF will not be invited because they “are not representative of those living in eastern Syria.” Al-Daghim also noted that the SDF needs to be dissolved and join the army, thereby remaining in line with Damascus’ approach to engaging the SDF so far. Indeed, while armed factions and political groups across Syria have agreed to (at least officially) dissolve themselves, the SDF and DAANES continue to insist that they will only join a larger Syrian army as a distinct bloc that retains its current structure – and a certain level of autonomy. This impasse has persisted over the past weeks; the longer it lasts, the more the SDF and DAANES risk being excluded from the conference and political process altogether. This risk is further compounded by failing to achieve tangible progress in establishing a united Kurdish front, and possible fragmentation as a result. A sign of this fragmentation could be seen in the recent withdrawal of the Kurdish National Council (KNC) from the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). While this move was publicly done to protest the treatment of Kurds in SIG-controlled areas, it was also likely taken as a manoeuvre to position itself as a party capable of engaging Damascus independent of the SNC – or even the SDF/DAANES. Indeed, while the KNC issued a public statement in which it criticized the manner in which the committee was formed, news recently emerged about a meeting between members of the KNC and al-Daghim in Damascus.
Efforts to overcome the current Damascus-SDF/DAANES impasse has been mounting over the past weeks. Most recently, a delegation from Turkey’s pro-Kurdish DEM party visited Erbil and met with Masoud Barazani, sharing a message from Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in which he expressed hopes that Barazani would intensify efforts to negotiate a Turkish-PKK de-escalation deal, which would yield significant impact on the trajectory of the SDF’s stalemate with Damascus. But time is ticking. Although no date has been set for the National Conference, pressure is mounting on all parties to resolve the impasse.
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