This blog is the first in a series of thought pieces discussing the current liminal moment in Syria, with the goal of exploring core issues that will significant impact stabilization prospects in the country.
A staggering insurgency and ensuing dissolution of a 54-year authoritarian regime has reopened a chapter of old challenges in Syria, but with new, hopeful possibilities. Despite fundamental differences in the contexts of countries grappling with the consequences of the Arab uprisings over the last decade, one common theme has been the vulnerability to water scarcity. There are consequently calls to avoid repeating previous mistakes made in the aftermath of changes in power elsewhere in the region.
Lessons have (theoretically) been learned about climate-driven displacement and demographic changes – as well as disruptions to local value-chains and agricultural practices. So far, the dangers of unchecked control over water resources have not been adequately recognized at points of peace.
For Syrians to have a real chance to rebuild their country, local and regional stakeholders need to recognize that long-term political stability will depend upon a water agreement that enables improved living conditions for citizens across the country.
Syria is acutely vulnerable – and poorly prepared – to deal with climate change, even more so than neighboring Iraq. The economy and food self-sufficiency of Syria has historically depended on agriculture, particularly from the Northeast Syria breadbasket. However, groundwater in the region now contains toxic fluoride levels from over-exploitation, while irrigation from waterways relies on inflated fuel prices or damaged hydroelectric infrastructure for its pumping.
The needs and gaps have become starker amidst the recent influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into the Northeast, illustrating the strain that has been placed on humanitarian services due to the lack of water. Ninety-two percent of IDPs from Aleppo have reported a lack of WASH services, with the region continuing to record increasing cholera cases.
Although the increasing desertification of Syria is driven by climate change, the country is also bearing the consequences of repeated water weaponization during its 14-year conflict, which has persisted throughout the recent offensive. Areas surrounding the strategic Tishreen and Euphrates dams in Manbij and Tabqa have seen continued armed clashes and changes in control since the opposition forces took control of Damascus this month. On December 10, the structure of Tishreen Dam was affected, with technicians unable to access the facility for repairs.
The NES NGO Forum called for the cessation of hostilities in the vicinity of Tishreen dam, warning that severe damage could affect up to one million people in the region. The following day, the Global Coalition reached an agreement with Türkiye on the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from territory west of the Euphrates, allowing the Turkish-Backed Syrian National Army (TSNA) to take control of Manbij and Tabqa.
Tishreen is vital not only for being the furthest upstream Syrian dam on the Euphrates, but is also the first dam below the confluence of the rainfed Sajur River, which runs along the northern Manbij boundary. A non-functioning dam poses immediate risks of severe flooding and could adversely affect hydroelectric stations downstream, including in Tabqa. A vast proportion of electricity in Syria, including in Homs, is produced by hydroelectric stations on the Euphrates.
Should the Northeast become unable to generate hydroelectricity, households would grow increasingly dependent on fuel imports – at a time when the country has lost access to Iranian oil and faces a volatile exchange rate.
Water is a key tool in the geopolitical arsenal being deploying to counter the security risks posed by the SDF and the consolidation of Kurdish territory on Türkiye’s borders. Airstrikes have repeatedly targeted infrastructure in the Northeast, with frequent diversions of the supply of water to Alouk station . With 89 percent of annual water volume in the Euphrates coming from the Turkish basin, its continued flow will be the primary determinant of the ability of Syrian actors to deliver life-saving health and food-security services.
An urgent window of opportunity exists during which recent efforts to prevent water politics and weaponization within the Syrian political transition could be achieved. The establishment of Syrian control over water resources must be given precedence in geopolitical recalculations, particularly those of Türkiye and the Global Coalition. As the bargaining chips of security guarantees, oil control, and reconstruction funds begin to be exchanged, an agreement on future water supply must be understood as a key variable for long-term stability and rehabilitation in Syria.
If one lesson can be taken from the Syrian revolution, it is that the capacity and success of armed groups in Syria should not be seen as vacuum-held “spoilers,” but rather as intrinsically linked to community interests. Many of the Arab populations in the Northeast have used the developments of the last weeks to amplify their opposition to SDF-rule. Manbij saw non-TSNA elements push back against the SDF, while local demonstrations called for the expulsion of the SDF in Tabqa. Notably, employees from local water stations in the Deiri villages of Marat and Mazlum also demonstrated against the SDF when its forces attempted to dismantle and relocate equipment from internationally supported stations. Yet, these actions should not be understood as automatic endorsements of the TSNA, as Türkiye is widely viewed as being responsible for the destruction and lack of water across communities in the Northeast. There is also widespread preference the areas to be administered by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and more moderate factions.
Whichever transitional or long-term authority comes to govern the Northeast – or Syria as a whole – it will need to be able to consolidate its institutions and negotiate enforceable protection for water resources and infrastructure across the Euphrates basin. Poor living conditions, a devastated economy, and the spread of diseases are risks that could undermine effective and cohesive governance of a country that has been fractured for over a decade.
The overthrow of the Assad regime has provided a rare opportunity for water governance along the Euphrates basin to be addressed by advocating for Syrian sovereignty over its resources. Without reaching an enforceable and incentivized agreement between local and regional stakeholders on the protection and sharing of water resources, the Syria that its people have fought for may not reach fruition.
Ellen Clarke is a research consultant specializing in conflict, climate, and humanitarian coordination. She is currently supporting Proximity's research in Syria and has worked on a range of issues in the country and the broader MENA region, including nature conservation.
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